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Now that the focus of international aid is very much on efficiency and 
outcomes, any model that appears to guarantee both is bound to attract 
the interest of donors. Thus, the approach of ‘Cash-on-Delivery’ Aid (COD 
Aid), which has been developed by Nancy Birdsall and others at the Center 
for Global Development, is receiving a lot of attention. One reason is that 
it seems to chime with the prevalent demand for a ‘bigger bang for each 
buck’ as the public spending of donor countries is slashed in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. 
This Development Viewpoint questions the assumed merits of COD Aid by 
assessing three of its major claims: 1) it would improve recipient ownership 
of policies and programmes, 2) it would make aid flows more regular and 
sustainable, and 3) its focus on measurable outcomes would enhances 
aid’s effectiveness. Our conclusion is that COD Aid is far from problem-free; 
instead it poses continuing challenges and raises new questions.
The ‘Cash-on-Delivery’ Aid Model
The COD approach argues that aid disbursements should become 
contingent on the achievement by recipients of pre-agreed outcomes in 
particular programmes or sectors. For example, funding for education might 
be based upon agreed annual increases in general enrolment rates, female 
enrolment rates or achievement levels. Donors would focus on the targets, 
leaving the recipient of aid free to devise its own policy or strategic plan for 
achieving them.
COD Aid appears, at first sight, to be an obvious strategy. Continued aid 
payments always should depend on good progress towards objectives, 
right? After all, isn’t that the purpose of monitoring and evaluation? 
And, indeed, COD Aid is not entirely original in its linking of aid 
disbursement to the achievement of results. But in linking aid to specific 
objectives or targets, it is a much more focused approach, with the 
potential—its proponents argue—for substantial gains in impact. So, how 
does COD Aid perform?
Improving Recipient Ownership
The champions of COD Aid claim that after the donor and recipient 
have mutually agreed the measurable outcomes upon which continued 
disbursements will be based, the recipient is free to devise the strategy for 
meeting those outcomes without external interference. Direct Budgetary 
Support (DBS) has a similar aim: it does not oblige the recipient government 
to spend aid in externally-defined areas, but enables it to take the measures 
that it sees fit to achieve agreed objectives.
COD Aid is not designed to replace DBS, which is linked to improving the 
general planning and implementation strategy of the government. Instead, 
COD Aid encourages the achievement of outcomes in specific programme 
areas. In this sense, it could improve recipient ownership of programme 
financing. 
However, it could be misleading to regard COD Aid as a tool for improving 
ownership in any substantive sense. Since such outcome-oriented systems 
impose targets on recipient governments, any meaningful sense of 
ownership is likely to be undermined. National policies and programmes are 
already supposed to be mutually agreed, based upon engaging civil society 
in discussions, reflecting local needs and assessing the concrete structural 
and social barriers to progress. 
Ultimately, COD Aid is mainly a tool for donors: they can more effectively 
justify and defend their aid and monitor the spending and policies 
of recipient governments without appearing to be heavy-handed or 
prescriptive. 
This criticism does not undermine the case for COD Aid since its proponents 
are not describing it as a panacea. It is not being advertised as a replacement 
for all aid channels, but as an additional tool that could achieve gains 
in particular programme areas. However, this approach’s claims that it 
promotes national ownership are decidedly problematic.
Stabilising Aid Flows
An aid model that proposes to reduce or even withdraw aid if the outcomes 
are not achieved would appear to be deeply destabilising, rather than 
working to reduce the recognised problem of aid volatility. Surely, the ability 
of recipient governments to plan over the long-term would be adversely 
affected. And there are numerous factors outside the control of those 
implementing programmes that could impede the achievement of agreed 
targets.
Supporters of COD Aid argue that once the outcomes and monitoring 
methods have been agreed, donors could pool their resources without 
imposing new structural demands upon the recipient. It would also be easier 
for new donors to join in without requiring renegotiation of the conditions. 
Also, since the recipient government knows that aid flows are linked to 
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outcomes, not to changes in donor policies and priorities, it could focus on 
achieving targets without fear that the aid might stop because of a change 
in government.
Critics of the COD aid model argue that because of the structural complexity 
of poverty, inequality and social exclusion, a government could fail to 
achieve outcomes because of factors that it could not have anticipated or 
would not have the capacity to address. In reality, it seems unlikely that 
donors would simply withdraw aid if outcomes were not met once, or there 
was good cause for missing the targets. 
A relevant example is the strategy being proposed by the Clinton Health 
Access Initiative for malaria control in settings in which the conditions for 
the disease are endemic. Governments would receive funding provided 
malaria levels remained below a certain ceiling. However, should that ceiling 
be breached, funding would not be withdrawn, but greater control would be 
exercised by donors over policy and strategy until government performance 
regained the momentum necessary to reach the agreed outcomes.
While such an approach would address the problem of aid instability, it 
tends to undermine the national ownership of policies and strategies. 
Because of the ever-present threat that donors would step in to reassert 
controls (or withdraw funding), recipient governments would be less 
likely to employ new or innovative programmes because of the fear of the 
consequences for failure. 
These issues lead to the natural question about who benefits most 
from COD Aid. Is it the recipient governments, who might prefer, in fact, 
other mechanisms more compatible with both aid stability and national 
ownership? Or is it primarily the donors, who can exercise more effective 
influence over how aid is allocated and how its impact is judged?
Enhancing Aid Effectiveness
Perhaps the main benefit of COD Aid could be its focus on measurable 
outcomes. For specific programmes, such as increasing the number of 
women attending ante-natal clinics, raising vaccination rates for children or 
reducing malaria prevalence rates, the outcomes could be easily monitored. 
And thus the efficiency of a particular aid-supported programme could be 
measured. 
Such an approach could also help improve the monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms of recipient governments. This would be especially important 
in settings where a dearth of official records can contribute to the exclusion 
of individuals from vital welfare services.
But the benefits of such results-oriented programmes remain ambiguous. 
Does COD Aid provide the citizens in a country receiving such assistance a 
suitable set of measures against which they could judge the performance 
of their government? Or do such externally determined targets actually 
constrain governments from directly addressing the demands and wishes of 
the population? 
Such results-focused external assistance could limit the scope for innovation 
and flexibility. And it could fail to address the constraints imposed by the 
underlying structural causes of poverty and inequality. Sadly, the record of 
donors in linking their programmes to wider development objectives is not 
commendable (see this author’s recent post on procurement policies). In this 
sense, COD Aid does not offer an approach that avoids more of the same.
Summing Up COD Aid
So how should we evaluate COD Aid? Its advocates are certainly not 
claiming that it is a new magic bullet. Though it remains largely untested, 
it appears to have the potential for improving outcomes in specific areas 
that are particularly suitable to a result-based approach. Certain health 
programmes, for example, could show measurable gains from the COD Aid 
approach. 
But some of its broad claims are questionable. For example, it will not 
necessarily improve national ownership. Also, it might not offer a more 
stable mechanism for aid flows. As discussed here, even when it helps 
stabilize aid, it could end up undermining national ownership. COD Aid is 
based upon the presumption that results-oriented aid is better and more 
efficient than other forms. But this claim, too, is problematic: in some cases 
and sectors such an approach might be more effective, in others it is likely 
not to be.
COD Aid is an approach that deserves to be tested. But even if successful, 
it could be only one tool amongst many in the necessarily complex efforts 
to reduce poverty, inequality and social exclusion. The danger is that once 
politicians seize upon this approach, they are likely to construct simplifying 
narratives based on largely unsubstantiated claims and propagate the 
misconception that achieving specific measurable outcomes are the Holy 
Grail for the optimal allocation of development financing.
For background material and more 
contributions on current development issues,
 see Michael Jennings’s blog: 
http://mikejennings101.wordpress.com/ 
